In the late 1990s, like many other developing countries, Haiti started a process of devolving responsibilities over irrigation scheme management to water users' associations. In this paper, a three-step methodology for institutional analysis is applied to investigate the functioning of this new setting in Haiti, using three irrigation schemes managed by farmers as case studies. First, the institutional structures are described using an adapted version of the Institutional Decomposition and Analysis framework. Secondly, the efficiency of the institutional structures is assessed against a set of criteria for sustainable management. The combination of these two steps allows the identification of strengths and weaknesses, and leads to the third and final step of formulation of practical recommendations. Results indicate that authorities in Haiti had a clear vision of the reform process which was translated in sound objectives, a comprehensive reform methodology and efforts to revise the legal framework. However, the outcome of the reform process has been negatively affected by a perceived organizational deficiency, and by the absence of a functioning water pricing system and of clearly defined and enforceable water rights. Finally, similar to the situation in many other countries, the major constraint faced by the established water users' associations appears to be financial self-sufficiency.
Introduction
Water resources development, preservation and management are on the agenda of major debates at global level. In most developing countries, irrigated agriculture, as the largest water consuming sector, is increasingly put under pressure to improve its performance (Wichelns, 2002; Malano et al., 2004) . In the future, it is likely that water will increasingly have to be diverted away from irrigation to meet the needs of urban areas and industry. However, given the importance of irrigation for global food production, this has to happen without compromising agricultural growth. In this light, improvements in the irrigation sector are needed at the technical, managerial and institutional levels to increase water use efficiency (Inocencio et al., 2002; Rosegrant et al., 2002; Wichelns, 2004) . Irrigation management transfers (IMTs) are one of the institutional innovations widely adopted. IMT is the process of shifting basic irrigation management functions from a public agency either to the private sector or to a more local entity, which can be a NonGovernmental Organization (NGO), a local government, or a local-level farmers' organization (Yercan et al., 2004) . The process is justified by the perceived inadequacy and inefficiency of publicly managed irrigation schemes (Le Gal et al., 2003; Gupta, 2004; Araral, 2005) . It is believed that, by introducing involvement and participation of users, water management and agricultural productivity will improve. In many cases, however, it appears that IMT is primarily adopted to reduce government expenditures allocated to the operation and management of irrigation schemes (Yercan, 2003; Gupta, 2004; Pasaribu & Routray, 2005) .
In Haiti, the government embarked on an IMT process in the late 1990s. This paper investigates the performance of the new institutional setting in Haiti using a three-step methodology. First, the institutions, defined as the institutional settings and arrangements that are crafted to run and manage irrigation schemes, are analyzed. Secondly, the efficiency of the given institutions is assessed. Thirdly, based on the revealed weaknesses and strengths, recommendations are made to improve functioning of the institutions and their outcomes. In most studies concerning the functioning of irrigation management performance, simple indicators are used (Lam, 2001; Malano et al., 2004; Yildirim & Cakmak, 2004; Kadiri et al., 2009) . Such indicators, however, do not reveal the reasons for good or bad performance. Therefore we developed a structured institutional approach, which adds this important information. Three irrigation schemes representative of the situation in Haiti were studied in detail.
The paper starts by presenting the three-step methodology used and by a short description of the study area and the data collection process. Next, the approach is applied to the case study, analyzing the institutional setting and assessing the efficiency. Finally, based on this, practical recommendations for improvements are made and some overall conclusions are formulated.
Methodology
The methodology proposed in this paper for institutional analysis of irrigation management builds on the three-step approach advocated by Herrera (2005) . The first step consists of gaining an understanding of the institutional structure underlying irrigation management. This is achieved using an adapted version of the Institutional Decomposition and Analysis (IDA) framework of Saleth (2004) . The IDA framework enables the review and analysis of water institutions, both at macro and micro levels. The second step constitutes assessing the efficiency of the identified institutional structure. The design principles formulated by Ostrom (1990) , Ostrom et al. (1994) , and Anderies et al. (2004) are used as criteria. The third and final step is the process of improving institutional arrangements. In our methodology, the focus is on looking for arrangements that could contribute to improving the current performance of the institutional structure. Each of these steps will be discussed in more detail in the following sections and a graphical representation of the approach is provided in Figure 1 .
The IDA framework, which is adjusted for this study is based on a two-stage decomposition of water institutions (Saleth, 2004) . First, water institutions are decomposed in an institutional environment which is determined by the constitutional, historical, economic, social and physical conditions of the country, and an institutional structure. Following the concerns of Plusquellec (2002) , the IDA framework is modified here by adding the design and physical infrastructure of irrigation schemes to the institutional environment. In a second stage of decomposition, the institutional structure is decomposed into water law, water policy, and water organizations or administration, an approach also taken by Bandaragoda (2000) . Each of these aspects can be further decomposed. As shown in Figure 1 , water law is broken down into water rights and accountability, water policy into national water policy, water pricing and cost recovery policies, project selection criteria, user participation or self-responsibility and, finally, the organization component breaks down into the organizational framework, financing and management responsibilities, regulatory arrangement, and conflict resolution mechanisms. The institutional settings revealed by the IDA framework are then evaluated using the eight design principles for long-term enduring institutions governing common-pool resources (Anderies et al., 2004) . These eight principles are: clearly defined boundaries; proportional equivalence between benefits and costs; collective choice arrangements; monitoring; graduate sanctions; conflict resolutions mechanisms; minimum recognition of rights to organize; and, finally, nested enterprises. The principles offer a checklist to test if institutional arrangements and attributes of institutions are likely to produce benefits that exceed costs and to lead to sustainability. Because of their versatility, these principles are applicable to the evaluation of institutions in most cultures around the world (Ward, 2007) . Using these two steps, the strengths and weaknesses of irrigation management in Haiti, and especially in the selected schemes, could be identified. This allowed some practical recommendations to be made to improve the performance of the new institutional settings.
Data collection, study area and sample characteristics
Because this study aims to understand and analyze water governance and the community-based management of irrigation schemes, different data collection methods have been combined. Data were collected in individual interviews with randomly selected farmers using questionnaires, by group discussions with different entities within Water Users' Associations (WUAs) as well as with other relevant local organizations, and through an extensive literature review. Such a combination of different data sources and collection methods, the so-called data triangulation (Theefeld, 2001) , is suitable to get an insight into complex systems.
For the evaluation of local management, three irrigation schemes were selected in the north of Haiti: Saint-Raphael, Grison-Garde, and Dubré. Varying in scheme size, number of users, cropping patterns and water distribution mechanisms, these schemes can be considered representative of the small-and mediumscale irrigation schemes in Haiti. Moreover, they have all undergone the process of management transfer. Table 1 presents the main descriptors of the three schemes, while Table 2 gives the sample sizes of the primary data collections.
The smallholders working on the schemes have on average 0.86 ha of land, with average farm sizes ranging between 0.2 and 2.5 ha. In Saint-Raphael, most farmers cultivate their land both in the summer season (rice) and winter season (vegetables). In Grison-Garde and Dubré, on the other hand, all farmers grow rice in summer but only a limited percentage cultivates their land during the winter season. Profit margins per ha vary between 16502 and 42598 Haitian Gourde (HTG) 1 in Grison-Garde and between 50921 and 66185 HTG in Dubré. Water charges represent an average 0.3 to 1.8% of the profit margin.
Case study: IDA of the institutional environment in Haiti Historical context of irrigation and rationale behind the IMT process in Haiti A prerequisite for understanding the current institutional environment is knowledge of the historical context of irrigation in Haiti. Irrigation was introduced in Haiti in the 17 th Century during French colonization. Between 1804 and the 1990s, government supported construction of schemes and subsidized operation and management costs. Parallel to this, small-scale schemes owned and managed by farmers were constructed. Currently, around 91,500 ha is equipped with irrigation infrastructure of which 80,000 ha is actually irrigated (Jean-Noël, 2005) . IFAD (2003) estimated that small-scale schemes (30 to 500 ha) account for about 15 000 ha. In the 1990s, it was perceived by all relevant stakeholders that both scheme types displayed mismanagement and inefficiency (MARNDR, 2000a) . This motivated and justified institutional change and a new equilibrium was sought, in which farmers' participation and involvement was intended to improve the management as well as the economic performance of irrigated agriculture. 
Socio-economic and political environment
A second aspect of the institutional environment constitutes the socio-economic and political context. Economically, Haiti has known a period of consistent decline, experiencing high inflation rates and a devaluation of the national currency. According to the World Bank (2006) the real income per capita in Haiti declined on average 1% per year between 1961 and 2001. In the agricultural sector, production and productivity have declined due to environmental degradation and lack of public investments in service delivery (World Bank, 2005) . Politically, the last two decades have been characterized by political conflicts, following thirty years of authoritarian regimes.
Legal framework
Haitian laws related to water issues are quite old and scattered within diverse general laws (MARNDR & BID, 1998) . The best-known examples are the constitution of 1987, the 'Rural Code' of 1962, and a number of decrees (Binette, 2005) . Some articles of the 1987 constitution (articles 36.3 and 36.5, as well as articles 31 and 31.3) specify the property rights of natural water resources and the rights every citizen has to freely participate in organizations aiming at the management of water. Other articles of the constitution (articles 519, 521, 522) clarify how a riparian owner can make personal use of a natural water source. With regard to users' involvement in the management of irrigation schemes, after a few unsuccessful trials, it was only in the late 1990s that the concept of participatory irrigation management was reintroduced in Haiti. Recently, some new initiatives have been taken to fill in the existing legal gap. At the end of the 1990s, the Ministry of Environment, with the support of the Inter-American Development Bank elaborated a project law for the water sector. Additionally, in order to launch and implement the IMT process, the Ministry of Agriculture, assisted by the private sector and with the help of international funding agencies, has also elaborated new texts. These include a framework law on water in general, a law on irrigation and drainage of agricultural lands, a law governing the status of professional agricultural organizations in general, a law settling the creation and functioning of irrigation water users associations, and a law on the irrigation management transfer itself. However, up to now, parliament still has to approve these new laws. In addition, it is clear that initiatives remain scattered.
Physical context: infrastructure and physical management tools
As advocated by Plusquellec (2002) , physical context and infrastructure are important features affecting irrigation management. They are therefore discussed here as part of the institutional environment. They will be discussed on the level of the three selected irrigation schemes (see also Table 1 ). The physical arrangement of the three schemes is similar: water is diverted from rivers by concrete diversion weirs and conveyed through a main canal. Small mechanical hydraulic gates are used to channel water to both secondary canals and hydraulic quarters. Farmers' fields are organized in hydraulic quarters around the secondary canals. The size of the hydraulic quarters can vary within the schemes. While the primary canals (as well as part of the secondary canals) are in concrete, the tertiary and quaternary networks are earth-made canals. Consequently water losses are quite high and the lack of distribution facilities such as repartition gates complicates water distribution and hampers secure delivery to the farmers.
Case study: IDA of the institutional structure in Haiti Organizational component Organizational structure of the WUAs managing the schemes. Each irrigation scheme is currently managed by a WUA, and by law every user of an irrigation system is automatically a member of the WUA. The organizational structure of the WUAs is based on the hydraulic division of the schemes. WUAs are organized at two levels. At the level of the hydraulic quarter, all users constitute a user group that is led by a committee of three members. At the level of the irrigation scheme as a whole, there are: (1) a Central Irrigation Committee (CIC), which is composed of all the presidents of the user groups, and which is in charge of the daily management and operation of the scheme; (2) commissions, or subcommittees of the CIC, which help to share responsibilities to operate, administrate and manage the systems; and (3) a General Assembly, theoretically the highest entity of the WUA, which is composed of all water users but in practice the minimum composition is determined by rules-in-use.
This organizational structure is intended to encourage and facilitate farmers' participation in scheme management. Nevertheless, free riding 2 and lack of incentives to voluntarily take up tasks are often reported to constitute major challenges for WUAs (Araral, 2005) . Furthermore, group discussions revealed a lack of communication and participation between the CIC and the users, and individual discussions with farmers also revealed that most of the commissions and user groups at the hydraulic quarter level are not really active. In addition, in Saint-Raphael there are problems of fairness and equitable representation of users in the CIC because the hydraulic quarters have widely varying number of irrigators.
Water distribution policy and organization. Water distribution policy in the three irrigation schemes is organized as follows. Each WUA has an irrigation service, consisting of hired labor, which is responsible for operating the system, ensuring water distribution and contributing to dispute resolution on the scheme. Along the main canals, water distribution is scheduled. In the secondary canals, water is supplied on demand and water is shared among users by rules of mutual understanding. Two conditions are required for farmers to be supplied with water: they must pay the requested fee and must participate in network maintenance.
To be successful, a flexible water distribution programme founded on mutual understanding requires the help and involvement of the hydraulic quarters' committees, the users' comprehension, as well as the supervision, honesty, and seriousness of the gatekeeper, who is primarily responsible for water distribution. Overall, this flexible distribution system seems to function relatively well. A reason for this success might be that the users themselves, through their boards of representatives, designed the norms and rules that govern the organization of water distribution in their scheme (Narain, 2004; Kadiri et al., 2009; PalermViqueira, 2009 ). Although improvements in terms of infrastructure (repartition gates) and equity between upstream and downstream distribution are still needed, users have recognized and confirmed that the actual distribution is much fairer, more reliable, equitable, and better organized than it was before the transfer process (Table 3) .
Maintenance of irrigation infrastructure. One of the core responsibilities of the WUAs is to ensure the maintenance of irrigation facilities. In the schemes studied, the CIC plans and organizes the maintenance of main canals, the user group committee of each hydraulic quarter organizes farmers to maintain the secondary network, and each user is in charge of cleaning the tertiary canals surroundings their plots. Payment is not foreseen for this service, since the financial resources of the associations do not allow this. Free rider problems seem therefore likely to occur but, during the field visit, most of the main and secondary canals appeared to be in good condition. Figure 2 also shows that participation in maintenance activities is high. Discussions with farmers and scheme managers, along with the observed conditions of irrigation networks, show that collective action has ensured maintenance of irrigation infrastructure.
Conflict management and dispute resolution. A final aspect of the organizational component is the conflict resolution mechanism. Most conflicts between the irrigation committees and the users originate from non-payment of the water fee. In principle, once a farmer cultivates his irrigated land, he has to pay the water fee. If he fails to pay, a system of gradual sanctions is applied against him. First, he receives a letter reminding him to pay the fee, then water supply to his plot is suspended, and finally, if he refuses to pay, he is arrested. In the case of the latter, the farmer also bears the costs of solving the conflict through the courts. In cases of deliberate damage to infrastructure, for instance if a farmer breaks a padlock, he is not only liable for repairing the damage but also has to pay a sanction fee. These examples show that, in the schemes under study, WUAs have designed rules that regulate the functioning of the scheme as well as farmers' behavior vis-à-vis water distribution and infrastructure maintenance. There remains, however, a lack of explicit mechanisms and procedures for conflict management and resolution among farmers.
Water rights: rules-in-use
Water law and the definition of water rights form a crucial aspect of the institutional structure. As mentioned above, there is a lack of a general framework of water rights in Haiti. Furthermore, in the studied schemes no irrigation scheduling exists at the level of the hydraulic quarters, nor a water distribution based on water flow or volume. The principles in use give water use rights to each farmer proportionally equal to the area of his farm. The managing boards of WUAs have the 'de facto' property right to allocate all water use rights to farmers. However, the ownership rights of the water resource, as well as irrigation infrastructure, remain state property. Each year the WUAs share the given water use rights to farmers against the payment of water fees and the implicit agreement to participate in the system's maintenance. The given water rights are attached to the land, specifically the cultivated field. However, this right is not specified in terms of quantity; it only allows the farmer to irrigate. Although water use rights are neither well specified nor transferable, rules in use establish an interesting basis towards the establishment of a workable water rights system at the scheme level. Efforts are needed to further improve this aspect, because clearly defined and enforceable water rights are critical for better organization of water distribution and improvements of water fee recovery (Herrera, 2005; Speelman et al., 2010a, b) .
Water policy
National water policy: strategy and methodology of the transfer in Haiti. A key aspect of the institutional structure related to water management in Haiti is the water policy, of which the strategy and methodology applied to transfer schemes are important features. Following the example of countries like the Philippines (Araral, 2005) or Taiwan (Lam, 2001) , the transfer process is intended to unfold gradually, first transferring the small-scale schemes and, after having learned from that experience, step by step the bigger schemes. This approach was also chosen because most of the schemes are in poor condition. Moreover, users must be prepared to assume the new responsibilities of managing irrigation water. To assure this, the state has elaborated a specific transfer strategy (MARNDR, 2000b) . The strategy aims to completely transfer management responsibilities to autonomous self-sufficient organizations. The State remains owner of the irrigation infrastructure and moreover some responsibilities will still be shared with the WUAs. Although the developed strategy attests to a clear vision, financial means and organizational structure to fully carry out the IMT program in Haiti are still lacking. One result is that only schemes where an external donor intervened were transferred.
Water charges -cost recovery -financial management. The success of IMT depends to a great extent on the ability to establish long-term financially self-sufficient WUAs. Therefore, irrigation fee recovery determines the success of an IMT. In Haiti, WUAs are responsible for the collection and management of irrigation water fees, and the fees should reflect the operation and management costs. In April 2007, the level of the water fee was 800 HTG/ha/year in Saint-Raphael, 700 HTG/ha/year in Grison-Garde and 120 HTG/ha/seasonal crop in Dubré.
The field study reveals that, on average, the collection rate is below 50%. This does not allow WUAs to cover administration and management costs of schemes. Moreover, low fee recovery seems to be a problem of willingness to pay rather than capacity to pay. Water is by far the cheapest input and charges currently represent only between 0.7% and 1.8% of the profit margin in Grison-Garde, and less than that (0.3% to 0.4% of the profit margin) in Dubré. Figure 3 shows the evolution of fee collection performance in Saint-Raphael and Grison-Garde. In Saint-Raphael, for the last eight years, the CIC only collected an average 75 HTG/ha annually, much less than the planned 800 HTG/ha/year. This is explained both by a low collection rate and a relatively high percentage of unused land in the scheme. The fact that most surveyed farmers consider the actual level of water charges acceptable reveals a gap between words and action. The absence of a good pricing system and clearly defined and applicable water rights can explain this finding. Up to now, WUAs were subsidized to enable them to balance their expenditures and revenues. By setting wages of employees as percentages of collected fees, the WUAs succeeded in covering the wages from the revenues. This system has two advantages: first, it gives incentives to the employees who are also responsible to collect the fees; and, secondly, wages cannot exceed the collected fees.
Fulfillment of the eight design principles in Haiti
The information from the institutional decomposition and analysis (IDA) presented above serves an input to test the fulfillment of eight design principles for long-term sustainability of institutions. The applicability of each principle is briefly evaluated below.
Design principle 1: clearly defined boundaries
Both in Grison-Garde and Dubré, WUAs hold limited records of farmlands. They have parcel plans in which relevant information for each field is registered. In Saint-Raphael, the WUA, with the assistance and 
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Grison Garde Fig. 3 . Evolution of fee collection performance in Grison-Garde and Saint-Raphael (1998-2006) . support of German Agro Action (GAA), has even completed an inventory of cultivated lands on a seasonal cropping basis. Thus, at least the physical boundaries and water users are well defined, up to a certain level. However, a different dimension of the resource remains ill-defined; managers in the schemes are not able to accurately measure and predict the quantity of water that will be available in the irrigation canals per period. Therefore, water rights can not be specified properly nor can water be distributed accurately to meet crop requirements. Water managers should have a better knowledge of the physical boundaries of the resource in order to be able to achieve better management performance.
Design principle 2: proportional equivalence between benefits and costs As explained above, the quantity of the water supplied to farmers is not fixed nor is it known in advance. Users pay irrigation fees proportionally to the area of irrigated land and, in addition, participate in maintenance works. Even though the fees are only intended to cover the operation, maintenance and administration costs of the system, this objective is not attained. Covering of construction costs is not even planned. Therefore, with the current system of fees, farmers clearly do not bear the full costs of benefiting from irrigation. Furthermore, the demonstrated low rate of payment further worsens the imbalance between benefits and costs for appropriating water.
Design principle 3: collective choice action
Although at this moment all three schemes are managed by the farmers, the origins of the schemes are different. The construction of Dubré and Grison-Garde was an initiative of the farmers, and external intervention was limited to strengthening local community capacity and to improving management performance. Saint-Raphael, on the other hand, is a government constructed scheme and, prior to 1990, farmers did not participate in the scheme's management. The concept of formalizing users' collective action of managing and running the schemes therefore constitutes a bigger change for Saint-Raphael compared to the other schemes. Currently, at the secondary and tertiary canal levels in the three schemes, water distribution as well as maintenance work is carried out by the user groups of the hydraulic quarters. At this level, informal and unwritten rules are combined with formal ones to control opportunistic behavior. The primary canals, on the other hand, are operated and maintained by elected representatives and the WUAs' technical staff. For this level, formal operating rules are elaborated by or with the farmers' participation. The managers of the schemes are thus either farmers themselves or people who are accountable to them. Findings of the field studies reveal that participation of farmers in the major activities of WUAs, like canal maintenance works and attending meetings, is rather good. This suggests that there is sufficient collective action in the studied schemes.
Design principle 4: monitoring
In all schemes, the Central Committee monitors overall scheme management. The field survey indicates that users are generally conscientious about controlling and maintaining the irrigation canals on which their economic activities rely. The farmers argue that their endogenous and self-enforcing institutional rules are far more effective than the exogenous imposed ones. As explained above, a large number of farmers are involved in rule enforcement and monitoring to control opportunistic behavior. However, mutual trust among users is crucial for overcoming the free-rider problem (Ostrom et al., 1994) , and an overall monitoring of WUAs' activities by a government agency is absent. Furthermore, although required by their functioning rules, none of the three WUAs have a control committee. Discussions with key stakeholders involved in schemes' management reveal a lack of proper institutional and organizational settings to effectively boost and assist local institutions and organizations.
Design principle 5: graduated sanctions
Although rules-in-use and self-imposed constraints to control opportunistic behavior exist, violations can easily be observed in all three schemes. Therefore, explicit graduated sanctions are elaborated. Nonpayment of the irrigation fee, for example, is subject to gradual sanctions, from sending a recall letter to arrest and detention. Systems of gradual sanctions exist on paper for all three schemes but the problem is their enforcement, which is often difficult and costly.
Design principle 6: conflict resolution
All three schemes lack explicit internal conflict resolution mechanisms. Consequently, even for minor conflicts, users refer to court. For instance, during the data collection in Saint-Raphael, a farmer prosecuted the CIC because his onion field had been flooded due to the misbehavior of another farmer. If the WUAs had appropriate institutional rules, settings and enforcement mechanisms, such disputes could be more cheaply solved through internal mechanisms.
Design principle 7: minimal recognition of rights to organize
One of the major implications of the new vision over scheme management in Haiti is the effort to give rights to local communities and their organizations to take responsibility for the management of the irrigation infrastructure they use collectively. Farmers in the given schemes are free, if not obliged, to organize themselves and to participate in project implementation and to further insure the management of the facilities they benefit from. Although appropriate legislation for securing the rights is still not fully settled, in the studied schemes such rights exist 'de facto' and water users are encouraged, helped, and supported to undertake a number of actions to strengthen their organizations to better carry out their tasks.
Design principle 8: nested enterprises
At the level of irrigation schemes, there exist different stages of organizations, from user groups to WUAs, which are responsible for the entire irrigation scheme. But, as water diverted from rivers is part of the available water resource (at the watershed level), there is no coordinating institution above the level of the WUAs to tackle issues related to resource allocation and development at a larger scale.
Practical recommendations
The strengths and weaknesses identified in the above analysis allow us to make some suggestions for improvements of the institutional arrangements for irrigation management in Haiti and the IMT process.
The macro level
The analysis of the legal framework and the water policy in the IDA showed that the State, through the Ministry of Agriculture, had a clear vision regarding irrigation management but also that some of the necessary organizational measures were not taken. Government entities should establish a sound water pricing system and help WUAs to elaborate mechanisms for the collection of water fees. The analyses at the scheme level regarding water rights, conflict management etc., called for a legal and operational framework supporting the local WUAs. Clearly defined and enforceable water rights, administrative tools to standardize accounting systems of new managers, and more standardized conflict resolution mechanisms would improve sustainability and efficiency of scheme management and exploitation by lowering transaction costs (Hearne & Donoso, 2005) .
The micro level
Based on the above analyses, recommendations can also be made to improve management performance and strengthen the viability of the institutions governing and managing irrigation schemes at the local level.
To address weaknesses regarding the organizational settings and arrangements, a review of the hydraulic division and thus the organizational structure of the WUAs is proposed. In practice, the size of the hydraulic quarters should be harmonized, and the number of representatives each secondary canal sends to the CIC should reflect the irrigated area and the number of users it contains. This could improve water distribution, enhance legitimacy and recognition of the CIC, as well as render the committees more dynamic at the level of the hydraulic quarters.
Taking into account the low efficiency and insecure water delivery, the WUAs together with their partners must continue to rehabilitate canal networks by increasing the concrete canal length, and by the construction of water control and measurement devices such as hydraulic gates. Network maps, with a complete inventory of the given irrigation facilities (canal lengths, hydraulic devices, etc.) can be a useful tool for the technical commission to regularly assess the state of infrastructure, or to plan and execute maintenance works as well as further network extension.
As demonstrated above, WUAs cannot achieve financial self-sufficiency with the current water charge system. To strengthen financial viability of the farmer-managed schemes, new pricing mechanisms should be considered. One possibility is a two-level charge, as proposed by Perret & Geyser (2007) . The first level of the fee would be charged on the basis of the total irrigated area, whether it is used or not. This part should help to cover the fixed costs of maintaining the system (canal maintenance as well as minimum functioning of the WUA). A second component of the water fee could be more variable, and could correspond to a payment for water delivery related services. The major challenge is determining the levels of the charges. This requires assessing long-term fixed costs as well as variable costs related to water delivery services. The other issue preventing the WUAs to become financially self-sufficient is the low rate of fee collection. As mentioned above, this can be tackled by improving the water rights system and by making farmers more aware of the realizations resulting from the use of the charges (Lam, 2001) . It is therefore advisable that a yearly technical and financial report on scheme management and maintenance activities is prepared and presented at each General Assembly.
Finally, improvements are needed to render scheme management more effective and more transparent. The WUAs should reinforce communication channels and mechanisms between their leaders and farmers to deal with the revealed lack of communication. Administratively, they need to improve (especially financial) information registration and bookkeeping. Explicit conflict management procedures and mechanisms should be put in place. The WUAs should also establish control committees, as prescribed in their functioning rules.
Conclusion
Using data from three irrigation schemes, a three-step approach was used in this study to evaluate the water governance and irrigation scheme management in Haiti. A field survey combined with a literature review has enabled us to get insights into the local institutions that have been crafted by or with users' participation to insure the operation, management, and administration of irrigation schemes.
With regard to the IMT process in Haiti, findings from the study have shown that the Haitian government has had a clear vision and objectives, which consists of transferring day-to-day scheme management to autonomous WUAs with duties to ensure operation, administration, and management of irrigation systems, as well as rights (although still 'de facto') to recover required funds from users by collecting water charges. A comprehensive methodology has been elaborated to establish such WUAs and to boost local institutions governing the schemes. However, the current social, political, and economic environment of irrigated agriculture is not favorable for a smooth management transfer, and the limited legal framework underlying irrigation management also represents a major impediment, inhibiting the success of the process. In addition, a well functioning water pricing system and clearly defined and enforceable water rights are still absent.
Nevertheless, farmers in the three irrigation systems concerned have succeeded in crafting local institutions to govern, manage and run their schemes. The irrigation systems are operated and administered by a combination of formal written rules (elaborated by or with the participation of the WUAs) and informal rules, norms, and customs that are in use to monitor, influence, control, and limiting the misappropriation of irrigation water. The established institutional settings and arrangements have enabled farmers' organizations to run the schemes while strengthening local leadership and collective action, increasing user participation, and improving water fee collection as well as scheme maintenance significantly. The most important weaknesses identified include the absence of explicit conflict resolution mechanisms, the low irrigation fee collection rate and the lack of communication between irrigation committees and users. Policy makers should look for approaches to tackle these issues. Several authors (Herrera, 2005; Speelman et al., 2010a, b) have shown that improvements in a water rights system can significantly improve willingness to pay for water and thus improve cost recovery. More transparency regarding the functioning of the WUAs can have a similar effect on willingness to pay for WUA services. Furthermore, the water pricing system should be fair and give farmers incentives to use water sparingly (Perret & Geyser, 2007) . Finally, support should be given to the WUAs to develop explicit conflict management procedures and mechanisms.
